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Throughout this Brief, Appellant will be referred to as 
"plaintiff," and Respondents will be referred to as "defendants," 
All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts, as set out in the Brief of Appellant, 
are undisputed. As indicated in the Statement of Facts, the 
only question involved in this appeal is whether or not plaintiff 
is entitled to witness fees for the entire number of days for 
"·hich he was held as a material witness. 
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As a matter of simplification and clarification, the points 
set out for argument in the Brief of the appellant will be main· 
tained herein, and argument submitted under each point as 
raised by the appellant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH, A 
PERSON COMMITTED TO JAIL BECAUSE OF INABILITY 
TO FURNISH A SURETY BOND IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
WITNESS FEES FOR EACH DAY OF CONFINEMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH, A 
PERSON COMMITTED TO JAIL BECAUSE OF INABILITY 
TO FURNISH A SURETY BOND IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
WITNESS FEES FOR EACH DAY OF CONFINEMENT. 
Attention of the court is respectfully called to the origin 
of payment of witness fees. It is well recognized that from 
the very beginning of the common law when any witnesses 
were required _!o appear and testify ill a criminal proceeding, 
that they were not entitled to compensation as a matter of 
right. Every competent citizen was required to appear and 
testify in a criminal proceeding. It was a duty imposed by 
the common law and there was no provision for payment. It 
is only in fairly recent times that statutes have been enacted to 
provide for compensation when witnesses are required to testify 
in a criminal proceeding. 
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A statute covering payment of witness fees now exists in 
the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and of course has been in our 
statutes for many years. The pertinent applicable statutes are 
21-5-2 and 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
These statutes are quoted herein for the information of the 
court: 
, "21-5-2. Witness and jurors fees in criminal cases-
Daily report of attendance - Every witness in a 
1 criminal case subpoenaed for the state, or for a defend-
ant by order of the state, and every juror, whether 
grand or trial, shall, unless temporarily excused, in 
person report daily to the clerk his attendance at court 
from the time of his appearance to the date of his 
discharge, and no per diem shall be allowed for any 
day upon which attendanc0 is not so 1·eported." 
( Italics ours ) 
"21-5-4. Witness fees and mileage.- Every witness 
legally required or in good faith requested to attend 
upon a city or district court or a grand jury is entitled 
to $6 per day for each day in attendance and twenty 
cents for each mile actually and necessarily traveled 
in going only; provided, that in case of a witness's 
attending from without the state in a civil case, mileage 
for such witness shall be allowed and taxed for the 
distance actually and necessarily traveled within the 
state in going only." 
Special attention is directed to the pertinent Utah statute 
21-5-2 which provides that every witness shall, unless tempm·· 
arily excused, report daily to the clerk his attendance at court. 
The latter portion of that statute provides that in order for any 
witness to be paid he shall be required to report his attend· 
nnce to the clerk for each day that he expected to be paid, 
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The court's attention is respectfully called to the case of 
Burtenshaw v. Bountiful Irrigation Company, 90 Utah 196, 
61 P. 2d 312, in which the court said: 
"It is settled in this state that the prevailing party 
is entitled to tax as costs the statutory per deim for 
witnesses subpoenaed in good faith and actually at-
tending the trial." ( Italics ours ) 
The court's attention is also respectfully called to the mat-
ter of Smith v. Nelson, 23 Utah 512, 65 Pac. 485, wherein this 
court said: 
"Under our statute, as we construe it, a witness 
subpoenaed and in actual attendance 0 (/< 0 is entitled 
to his fees 0 0 0 ( Italics ours ) 
The following paragraph is also extracted from the case 
of Smith v. Nelson above cited: 
"It is further insisted that the court erred in allow-
ing witness fees for witnesses who were at the same· 
time in attendance upon court in several other cases 
in which the plaintiff was a party. Under our statute 
(section 994, Rev. St.) as we construe it, a witness 
subpoenaed and in actual attendance in several cases 
at the instance of the same plaintiff is entitled to his 
fees in each case, although the suits are pending at the 
same time and place. Other jurisdictions have ruled 
likewise on this subject. 5 Enc. Pl. & Prac. 139; Willink 
v. Reckle, 19 Wend. 82; Flores v. Thorn, 8 Tex. 377; 
Robison v. Banks, 17 Ga. 211; Vence v. Speir, 18 How. 
Prac. 168; Dorrell v. Johnson 17 Pick. 263; McHugh v. 
Railway Co., 41 \Vis. 79; Hicks v. Brennan, 10 Abb. 
Prac. 304; Eames v. Black, 72 Me. 263." 
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Vve must admit that there is some conflict between the 
authorities as to whether a witness who is detained in custody 
for future appearance may recover witness fees for the entire 
period of detention. With respect to cases which have arisen 
in connection with this subject, the majority of jurisdictions 
hold that there can be no recovery. See 58 American Juris-
prudence, Paragraph 885. 
The courts hold that statutes authorizing payment of a 
wih1ess while attending court did not extend this doctrine to 
the time while a witness is forcibly detained awaiting for the 
trial to take place, It would appear that this rule would be the 
applicable one under our statutes. 
First of all, our statute indicates that in order for a witness 
to obtain compensation he must report his attendance at court 
each day to the clerk of the court. The cases above cited also 
indicate that he can be paid only for those days on which he 
actually attends court. Based upon the above cases and the 
Utah Statute cited, it is the position of the respondents that the 
plaintiff is entitled to witness fees for the days that he actually 
attended court and reported his attendance to the clerk of the 
court. For the remainder of the time that he was detained 
awaiting hearing on the matter, it is the position of respondents 
that there can be no allowance made for witness fees to the 
plaintiff, for the period of time that he was in custody but not 
in actual attendance of the court and for days when he did 
not report his attendance to the clerk of the court. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this court should affirm 
the decision of the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and dismiss the appeal of the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK E. MOSS, 
WILLIAM J. CAYIAS 
Counsel for Respondents 
513 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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